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Abstract
This paper illustrates how to incorporate forward-looking behavior into empirical spatial
equilibrium models with locational heterogeneity. The main insight is that the standard
spatial equilibrium already embeds a natural starting point for dynamics: the presence of
spatial indifference conditions can dramatically simplify the state space of forward-looking
agents. One needs to know how utility evolves with the variables in the system, but
not every individual state, effectively side-stepping the curse of dimensionality. Standard
numerical rational expectations methods can be applied to derive approximate solutions to
the full dynamic specification. The paper uses an example model of landowners exercising
real options in construction of housing to show how the approximation’s errors are negligibly
small, and importantly, much smaller than the differences between dynamic and myopic
specifications of the same model.
Keywords. spatial equilibrium; spatial dynamics; rational expectations; housing supply
JEL codes: R13, C63, D58, R31
1 Introduction
Spatial indifference is the hallmark of the classical spatial equilibrium model. In the typical
model, free mobility among a sufficiently large number of agents ensures equal utility at all
points in space, else someone would move. This, when combined with other conditions specific
to the context, pins down the endogenous variables of the system (e.g. wages, rents, travel costs,
proximity to employment or amenities, etc.) because the particular source(s) of the utility flow
can vary over space. The literature leveraging these models, whether within-city models like the
monocentric city model and its variants (Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), Muth (1969), summarized
in Brueckner (1987)), or the between-city regional model of Roback (1982), is voluminous.
The nature of these models is fundamentally static: indifference at a given moment. But cities
are full of durable elements, from geographic features to evolving capital stocks to municipal
∗Department of Economics, Georgia State University. Correspondence to: kmangum@gsu.edu. I thank the
participants of the conference on Advances and Applications of Spatial Equilibrium, sponsored by Economic
Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID). I also thank the Duke Urban-Environmental Working Group for access and
hosting of data. Errors are my own.
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boundaries and policy regimes, meaning a static model with myopic agents is a major simplifica-
tion. The dynamic spatial equilibrium model has made limited inroads to the literature in urban
and regional economics. While there are many conceptual reasons for forward-looking behavior,
there are also many practical reasons to avoid it, as state spaces in spatial models, where location
itself is a form of heterogeneity, quickly suffer from the curse of dimensionality. Yet, there are
reasons to believe that dynamic and myopic models can deliver substantially different results,
so eschewing a dynamic approach in the interest of convenience may be consequential.
This paper suggests a readily feasible method for incorporating forward-looking behavior into
a standard class of spatial equilibrium models. The goal is to make dynamic versions of such
models easy to implement empirically for simulation and estimation. The basic insight is that the
classic spatial equilibrium model already contains a natural structure for incorporating dynamics.
In models with conditions for spatial indifference, forward-looking agents need not keep track of
all states in the economy–which can balloon out of control in a model of heterogenous spaces–but
rather track only how they expect the utility condition to evolve. The evolution of this utility
condition could be endogenously subject to the actions of the other agents in the economy,
meaning a rational expectations equilibrium will be obtained when agents correctly predict (in
expectation) the evolution of the utility condition factoring in the responses of other agents, who
in turn factor in their expectations of other agents’ reactions, and so on. This approach combines
components of standard spatial equilibrium and dynamic optimization models: a free mobility
condition pinning down utility, but durable features evolving under the control of forward looking
agents. It then borrows intuition from the well-known literature on rational expectations models
with heterogenous agents, where certain variables evolve under endogenously determined laws of
motion.1 The paper illustrates the logical progression from a single agent dynamic model with
exogenous variables describing the aggregate economy to a dynamic equilibrium version with an
endogenous transition of those aggregate variables.
The approach is designed for empirical models (i.e. those to be estimated and simulated) and
relies on a numerical implementation. It is an approximation to the fully specified (infeasible)
equilibrium when agents are heterogenous, because their reactions may depend on their own
features and the sources of utility. That is, an agent may know the aggregate state and forecast
utility to evolve to a certain point, but deviations from the rule could result from dependence
on the distribution of shocks across agents.2 For example, consider a set of local markets of
varying supply elasticity for some consumption good. Conditioning on aggregate demand, if a
local relative demand shock occurs in a market with more elastic supply, a higher quantity of the
1For a textbook treatment of rational expectations models, see Ljungdvist and Sargent (2001). The numerical
approach is based on Krusell and Smith (1998), although applications with finite numbers of agents, such as this
paper’s, are also comparable to Weintraub et al. (2008).
2Identical agents are a special case in which this approach is not an approximation, but also one in which the
curse of dimensionality may not be present.
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good would result in equilibrium than if the relative demand shock occurred in an low supply
elasticity local market.
It is effectively impossible to know exactly how much error is in the approximation relative to
the fully specified equilibrium because solution of the full model is utterly infeasible, but features
of the underlying model give insight as to how much heterogeneity is being smoothed away with
aggregate laws of motion. The paper uses an example model to show that the perturbations
to an agent’s policy function are small, and importantly, much smaller than the differences
between dynamic and myopic models. In general, the approach performs better as the number
of agents in the economy grows, because laws of large numbers apply to the shocks across agents.
Thus, in many cases, using this approach for a dynamic model is preferable to assuming away
dynamics altogether, and it performs better just as the dynamics would be increasingly difficult
to incorporate.
The relevant environment is one in which mobility of some factor(s) can enforce a no arbi-
trage/equal utility condition, but there exist agents that are heterogenous and fixed in place, live
for more than one unit of time, and face constraints or frictions that introduce state variables
to their problem. Obvious applications for the forward-looking agents are landowners and local
or regional governments.3
The number of forward-looking agents is of practical importance. On one extreme, in a
two-agent model (like a two region economy), each agent has one response function to consider,
so it is feasible to track all agents state spaces, meaning no approximation is necessary.4 At the
other extreme of an infinite number of agents, and the approach is essentially that of Krusell
and Smith (1998) in a uniquely spatial context. This paper will illustrate the in-between cases,
where the number of forward-looking agents is finite but there are too many to compute full
solutions.5 These cases naturally correspond to many empirically relevant contexts, like cities
in a national economy, states in a federation, or neighborhoods in a metropolitan area.6
The context illustrated here is one of capital construction in heterogenous spaces; specifically,
housing construction across metropolitan areas in the U.S. In this context, the population of
housing consumers enforces a spatial equilibrium utility condition across cities, but the land-
controlling agents in the cities must decide how much durable and irreversible housing to add
3The equal utility condition is of course a common assumption in urban models, but some recent island
economies models, discussed below, seek to relax it.
4Certain small spatial economy models can get complicated when considering multiple person types and
sectors, but different solution approaches apply. See also footnote 1.
5An infinite number of a discrete type of agents resembles a weighted version of the example of this paper.
Indeed, in that the evolution of U¯ in this model hinges on a continuous variable that is affected by agents of
different sizes, it is essentially a share-weighted aggregation of discrete types.
6The focus here is on a fixed number of locations, not an endogenously determined number as encountered
in systems of cities models (Henderson (1974), Black and Henderson (1999)). This is not consequential, since
a suitably defined partitioning of land would deliver a fixed number of agents, and nothing about the method
imposes size or density restrictions on land partitions. In fact, the method could be useful in analyzing the
dynamics of lands at different levels of development.
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in a given period, knowing that construction exercises a real option over its land inputs and can
affect future prices and costs. The model features forward-looking agents in heterogeneous spaces
with continuous choice variables (land and capital inputs). Housing construction is a natural
place to exhibit the approach because it is emblematic of conditions that make dynamic models
both desirable and difficult. The literature has shown renewed interest in understanding housing
construction, but has yet to incorporate forward-looking behavior into an equilibrium setting.7
This is despite a history of theoretical and empirical research on housing developers exercising
real options on land.8 The paper closes with examples of policy simulations for dynamic and
myopic versions of the model, demonstrating where the specifications depart from each other.
The differences between models can be complex and nuanced, dependent on situations in the
economy and attributes of the heterogeneous agents. The lesson is that researchers may not
know just how different the empirical results can be until both specifications are used. It is the
goal of this paper to make feasible the dynamically-specified alternative.
As Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) describe, the literature on spatial dynamics is still
relatively small, with few papers incorporating dynamics into environments with rich spatial
heterogeneity. The current paper relates to three strands of work at the frontier of spatial
dynamics. One strand uses evolving static equilibria, in which states of the economy change but
agents solve static problems (e.g. Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010), Glaeser et al. (2014), Morten
and Bryan (2015), Morten and Oliveira (2016), Diamond (2016)). Sometimes these models
are augmented with “adjustment costs” which impose frictions in any given period but do not
alter the agent’s decision horizon. While these can be useful tools, they are not fully specified
internally consistent models, since we must impose some naivete on the agents–they are always
surprised to wake up tomorrow. As the paper shows below, the out-of-sample predictions of
myopic and forward-looking agents can be materially different.
Another strand concerns endogenous growth and spatial development (e.g. Black and Hen-
derson (1999), Quah (2002), Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007), Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg
(2010), Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014), Desmet et al. (2015)). These models tend to be
very rich and complicated, but have features such that in equilibrium the spatial heterogeneities
disappear and/or the dynamics reduce to simple time-invariant conditions, like balanced growth
paths.9 This paper resembles these approaches in that it reduces the state space to be a function
of aggregate state variables, but the rational expectations approach here need not be restricted
7Recent comparative studies of regional housing supply in spatial equilibrium include Saiz (2010), Glaeser et al.
(2014), and Albouy and Ehrlich (2016). Housing supply models with forward-looking agents include Paciorek
(2013) and Murphy (2013). These are partial equilibrium settings.
8For theoretical treatments, see Arnott and Lewis (1979), Titman (1985), Capozza and Helsley (1990),
Capozza and Li (1994), Capozza and Li (2002), Novy-Marx (2007) . For empirical evidence, see Cunningham
(2006), Cunningham (2007), Bulan et al. (2009).
9The richest model of spatial dynamics to my knowledge appears in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014) and
Desmet et al. (2015). There, particular assumptions on free entry of firms and diffusion of knowledge allow for
the solution of static problems instead of dynamic programs.
4
to steady states or balanced growth paths, allowing for analysis of shocks or policies at any point
in the state space, including transitional paths. However, this paper envisions applications of
policy analysis near observed equilibria, and is not designed to study endogenous growth, and
therefore these are complementary works for different types of questions.
A third related strand studies population dynamics in island economies models (see Rap-
paport (2004), Rappaport (2005) for neoclassical growth models with labor mobility, and see
Davis et al. (2013), Yoon (2014), Nenov (2015), Mangum (2015) for dynamic island economies
settings). These models incorporate sticky features like moving costs, housing, or physical and
human capital accumulation, and in so doing abandon the standard spatial equilibrium frame-
work of no arbitrage in utility. Different equilibrium concepts apply. Yoon (2014) in particular
is related because it also uses a forecasting rule to approximate rational expectations equilibria,
although in Yoon (2014), the state space complexity comes from multiple types of people and
sectors in a two-region economy.10
Comparing to the existing literature, the approach suggested here rigorously incorporates
dynamics and does not avoid forward-looking behavior, but by offering a modification of a
common setting, provides a convenient starting point for practitioners. The analyses can be
conducted using standard equilibrium concepts and dynamic optimization techniques.
The paper proceeds in six parts. Section 2 introduces a partial equilibrium model of a
forward-looking agent deciding whether and when to develop housing on vacant land. Dynamic
and myopic versions are compared. The following section expands the model to a general equi-
librium setting of a collection of forward-looking agents and proposes an approximated solution
method. Section 4 evaluates the performance of the approximation method in the context of the
example model. Section 5 provides a brief overview of estimation of the housing construction
model; details are relegated to appendix section A. Section 6 compares the results for dynamic
and myopic specifications in fit, estimation, and counterfactual simulations. Section 7 concludes.
Appendix B provides details on the computation of the dynamic model.
2 Models With Forward-Looking Agents
The paper will illustrate the intuition of the approach to solving dynamic spatial equilibrium
models by using a running example of housing suppliers across heterogeneous locations in a
closed economy. I introduce the essentials of the model in this section. Construction is a natural
10Given the different environment, Yoon (2014) is more related to Lee (2005) and Lee and Wolpin (2006).
These estimate models of worker sectoral mobility (discrete choice) with iterative rational expectations routines
to determine the endogenous sectoral skill prices. These also adopt forecasting rules to approximate rational
expectations equilibria, though the aggregation is over a large number of individual agents in a small number of
sectors. The current model has single agents in a large number of locations (parallel to sectors), which is more
similar to a dynamic game with many players.
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context for an example since the capital is durable and development involves the exercise of real
options. With that said, the point here is not to argue whether all housing models should be
dynamic, but rather admit the possibility that some models should be. Nor is this the only
type of application envisioned for the techniques, but merely a relevant example. I illustrate
the differences in behavioral predictions in myopic and dynamic models and offer suggestions
for their tractable implementation when appropriate.
Before proceeding, notice that there are multiple senses of the word “dynamic.” One is that
the economy has durable features (i.e. state variables) that transition over time. Another sense
is that the agents of the economy are aware of the durability and live long enough to be impacted
by it. The former contrasts a dynamic environment versus a static (or malleable) one, while
the latter concerns forward-looking versus myopic agents. In terms of solving and implementing
models, it is clearly the horizon of the agent that matters most. Dynamic optimization models
can be substantially harder to solve, estimate, and simulate than myopic ones. As described in
the introduction, dynamics have been introduced to spatial models via myopic agents solving
static problems under evolving conditions. This is fundamentally not the same as modeling
behavior of an agent who knows s/he lives for more than an instant of time and that future out-
comes will depend in part on current decisions. The behavior of that agent may be substantially
different. I will refer to the two models as “dynamic” and “myopic” to emphasize the difference
is in the decision horizon, while both versions have evolution of state variables.
First I consider whether the myopic and dynamic versions of this model are materially dif-
ferent in partial equilibrium; that is, with the agent capable of altering his own states but not
affecting prices or the utility level of the economy.
2.1 A Model of Housing Supply in Heterogeneous Locations
An economy consists of a finite number of locations J which offer unique bundles of income,
housing, and amenities to consumers. Each location consists of one agent responsible for housing
supply; consider one of these agents. The housing supplier is profit maximizing, lives infinitely
over discrete periods, and discounts future profits at rate β. The agent is endowed with ownership
of undeveloped land and decides whether and when to convert vacant land into housing, which
can be sold (including its underlying land input) to consumers; hence, I will refer to this agent
as “the builder.” There is a stock of housing H built atop a stock of land area A, and stocks
depreciate at rate δ. The builder can add to the stock but cannot intentionally remove it. It
is this irreversibility which makes the builder’s problem dynamic: vacant land has continuation
value, so its development exercises a real option.11
11The assumptions of infinite life and complete irreversibility are not necessary for imposing dynamics. Any
nonzero removal cost would also impose a dynamic externality over multiple periods of life. The point is that the
builder lives for multiple periods and something about the stock is durable, i.e. “putty-clay,” not “putty-putty”
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The builder’s problem is written recursively as
V (X) = maxx[pi(X, x) + βE(V (X
′|X, x))] (1)
where V is the value function for behaving optimally (“Bellman”), pi() represents flow profits,
X are state variables, x are choice variables, and E() is the expectation taken over future states.
Note the expectation is conditional on (i) current states, so there may be persistence, and (ii)
current period choices, so decisions may affect the evolution of states (in particular, the builder’s
stock variables).
2.1.1 Production and Input Factors
The builder makes housing services by combining land and capital. The production function is
given by
i = F (a, k, φ, α) (2)
where i is housing services added to stock, a is land input, k is capital, and φ and α are parameters
governing housing productivity and the elasticity of substitution between inputs, respectively.
In the empirics below, I use the standard Cobb-Douglas production function, i = φaαk1−α.12
The builder decides how much of each input to use each period. He adds to the housing
stock according to (2), and the relative quantities of k and a determine density of building. A
unit of capital comes at cost κ. This represents materials (wood, brick, glass, etc.) and the
labor and equipment costs of their installation. A unit of land comes at cost ρ. This represents
the cost of converting virgin land to suitability for building.13 Additionally, the builder faces
a cost convex c(·) in the amount of housing added in one period. This cost captures anything
inelastically supplied in the city in a short time horizon (frictions in procuring new land, delays
at the permit office, opposition to “excessive” new building, etc.). For exposition, I refer to it as
the land assembly cost (i.e. the difficulty of getting all the housing together at the same point
in time). Convexity is mathematically important as well because it ensures a finite solution.
Also, convexity effectively allows for within-city heterogeneity in costs and returns obscured by
a single builder, meaning that under reasonable parameterizations, there is nonzero construction
flow in each period, which is always a feature of the data for wide enough geographies (e.g. U.S.
counties or larger).
and rebuilt each period (see also Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007)).
12Recent work on the housing production function has found a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function
to be a reasonably good approximation. See Epple et al. (2010), Combes et al. (2012), Ahfeldt and McMillen
(2014), Albouy and Ehrlich (2016).
13Recall that the builder already owns the land and resells it in post-production form. Any land costs are
therefore in the acquisition, holding, and conversion of land, not its market value.
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The housing services output is sold at a price R to be explained below. The builder’s flow
profits are
pi = Ri− κk − ρa− c(·)
1 + ν
i1+ν
where ν ≥ 0 governs the extent of the convexity. Within a small area like a city, land is in
limited supply. To reflect the exhaustibility of land,14 I specify the land assembly cost function
to be increasing with the amount of land already employed, c = c(A), c′(A) ≥ 0.15 This means
that the cost of adding more housing within a period is increasing in the amount of land already
used up; or in other words, the short run elasticity is decreasing as land disappears. Intuitively,
this could reflect increasing difficulty in land assembly, or greater likelihood of facing opposition
from existing residents. Empirically, many large U.S. cities have seen housing prices increase
faster than construction flows, indicative of decreasing price elasticity.
Assuming differentiability of the value function allows for the derivation of analytical first
order conditions for optimization.16 Taking first order conditions yields, after some manipulation,
Fa
Fk
=
ρ− βVA
κ
(3)
For example, if F is Cobb-Douglas,
Fa
Fk
=
φαaα−1k1−α
φ(1− α)aαk−α =⇒
k
a
=
1− α
α
ρ− βVA
κ
(4)
which provides a condition for the demand for capital as a function of land (or vice versa). Using
∆ = ρ−βVA
κ
, the production function becomes
i = φ(∆a)1−αaα = φ(
1− α
α
∆)1−αa (5)
which shows that the density of construction depends on the production function parameters
and the relative costs of land and capital, ∆. The important point to note is that the cost of
land includes its shadow price, VA, the effect it has on continuation value, which will be negative
since land is exhaustible (so −VA is positive, like a cost). Otherwise (3) and (4) are typical
expressions of the rate of factor substitution. When the shadow value is larger in magnitude,
because, say, land is near its exhaustion or future demand is expected to be high, builders will
14I use the term “exhaustible” for exposition, though technically I am not imposing a maximum amount of
land available. This is consistent with standard models of urban areas that often endogenize the city boundary.
15This is not the only way to capture exhaustibility, but one specification which I found to be consistent with
the data.
16The flow profit function is smooth and continuously differentiable, so the value function should inherit these
properties (Stokey et al. (1989), Thm. 9.10). The policy function may be discontinuous at a threshold; at low
enough output prices, the builder can decide to construct zero.
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choose denser construction (more capital per unit of land) in order to conserve land.17
The factor demand condition allows for the re-expression of (1) as a continuous choice of a
single input. Using Φ = φ(1−α
α
∆)1−α,
V (X) = maxa[RΦa− (Φκ+ ρ)a− c(A)
1 + ν
(Φa)1+ν + βE(V (X ′|X, a))]
Maintaining the assumption of the differentiability of V , the above yields an analytical ex-
pression for the policy functions.
a =
(RΦ− (Φκ+ ρ) + β(VHΦ + VA)
c(A)Φ1+ν
) 1
ν (6a)
i =Φa (6b)
From the upper expression, (6a), we can see that the amount of land exercised depends positively
on the price of the output, and negatively on current costs, densities, and shadow costs. The
shadow price of additional housing stock itself, VH , independent of the land, is present in this
expression. This will become important in the general equilibrium version of the model, but will
be zero under the assumption that the solitary builder has no effects on prices.
Consider how two locations with heterogeneity in primitives might have different policy
functions. Higher land or capital costs will cause one to build less than another. Higher land
costs relative to capital will result in greater density through factor substitution. Higher assembly
costs have the direct effect of less building, mitigated by the fact that these also increase density
through the shadow value of land. Similarly, a greater shadow value of land results in less land
exercised, partly through increased density and partly through greater reluctance to build at all.
2.1.2 Output Prices
Local utility, from consumption of numeraire goods n, housing h, and amenities µ, equals a
reservation utility offered by the economy. The between-city condition is
u(n, h, µ) = U¯
I am treating U¯ as exogenous in this section, but later consider it determined by spatial equi-
librium conditions throughout the economy.
Within cities, utility maximizing consumers tradeoff between the consumption of numeraire
goods and housing services, subject to a budget constraint determined by the city’s income.
Housing services are rented for one period at rate r. Consumers are freely mobile and do not
17Additions to the housing stock may also have a shadow cost, VH , which can affect the total amount of
building, but this drops out of the relative first order conditions determining density.
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have assets, so they solve a static problem. For example, if consumers have a standard log
Cobb-Douglas utility function, u = ln(n) + γln(h) + µ, the intra-location first order condition
for optimization combined with the budget constraint y = n+ rh yields
r =
γ
1 + γ
y
h
(7)
for a given stock of housing, H, in the location. If the stock of housing is divided equally among
the population of residents in the location, p, then h = H
p
. The population–and hence, the rental
rate and housing services per person–is pinned down by the reservation utility condition
ln
H
p
= U¯ − ln( 1
1 + γ
y)− µ (8)
Intuitively, (8) shows that consumers are willing to suffer less housing when local income
and/or amenities are greater (when rents are higher). Moreover, combining (7) and (8) shows
that rents will be lower, ceteris paribus, when the outside option is higher (when other places
are relatively more attractive to consumers).
Consumers rent housing each period but builders sell it after construction. I want the model
to focus on the builder’s real options problem, not an asset pricing problem. Hence, I model the
construction decision only, not a landlord’s problem of renting existing stock to consumers. A
modeling device for this is to assume the builder sells the stock to risk neutral middlemen who
in turn rent it to residents. The price of this transaction should be determined as the present
value of the future stream of rents. For simplicity, I assume risk neutrality and that incomes are
a random walk, so the price is the discounted sum of current rents, inclusive of depreciation of
the stock.18
R =
1
1− δβ r (9)
2.1.3 The Builder’s Solution
The state variables for the partial equilibrium version of the model are local income, y, land
already used, A, and the reservation utility. I will assume for simplicity that local amenities do
not evolve, though this is not necessary for any results. Housing stock itself is not a state variable
in partial equilibrium (seen by combining (7) and (8)), but will be in general equilibrium. The
partial equilibrium builder’s problem is written as
V (y, A, U¯) = maxa[pi(y, A, U¯ , a) + βE(y
′, A′, U¯ ′|y, A, U¯ ; a)] (10)
18A practical issue for empirical implementation is that the builders either need to cover their cash cost of
physical materials or have access to a financing market, and the latter would greatly complicate the model without
much value added.
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This is solved by (6a) and (6b) given laws of motions for the exogenous states y and U¯ . The
endogenous state evolves according to A′ = (1− δ)A+ a.
2.2 Dynamic and Myopic Versions of the Model
Consider two versions of the above model: one in which the builder is forward looking, and
another in which he is not, though the states evolve as specified in the dynamic version. The
latter case is a myopic model, in that the builder is unaware of effects his actions have on future
states.19 The above derivations would apply, except that any shadow values would no longer be
relevant–the VA, VH terms drop out. How different might these be?
The next exercise gives an empirical comparison of these specifications for reasonable cali-
brations some (imaginary) U.S. metro areas.
2.2.1 Comparing Policy Functions
I consider a generic location with attributes of a typical large U.S. metro area: a population
of 2.5 million residents, and housing services per person of 511 sqf. at a floor area ratio of
0.053 (which determines the land employed). The mean per capita income set to the national
average of $28,500. The builder in the location may face high (+1sd), medium (±0sd), and
low (−1sd) demand states of income and national utility, for a matrix of nine potential demand
states. These yield output prices of (9) via (7), (8), and then choices according to (6a),(6b)
after solving (10).20 I calculate the elasticity of each of these policy functions relative to the
medium-medium demand state. I do this at high and low values of parameters on assembly cost
(using c(A) = cA, c = 100±50, ν = 1) and housing productivity (using φ = .05± .025), for each
specification of the model, to see how the elasticities might vary with local attributes. Using the
elasticity relative to the midpoint abstracts from level differences between cities with different
attributes. I emphasize that all other variables of the model are the same, so that this exercise
illustrates the impact of time horizon in a ceteris paribus setting.
Table 1 reports the percentage changes in policy functions for each type of model. (I will
loosely use the term “elasticity” to describe the percentage changes.) The upper panel reports
the percentage difference for land employed, while the lower panel reports housing services. The
table is read in three-by-three blocks; for example, in the first block of numbers in the table,
corresponding to the myopic model of the low cost, low productivity city, it shows that land
developed is 10 percent lower in the low income, low national utility state than in medium
19This could be naivete or because the builder lives for only one period. A short decision horizon is unappealing
here because the “builder” is really the landowner/custodian–not a fly-by-night construction firm–which is meant
to capture real options for profit maximizing entities as well as constraints imposed by local governments who
care about future externalities.
20I take the observed AR1 transition of local incomes y and U¯ from the data described in appendix A.
11
income, medium utility state. (The middle entry of each block is zero by construction.) Recall
that national utility, i.e. the value of the outside option, has an inverse effect on local demand,
so that the lower left corner is the highest demand scenario for each city (high local income and
low outside option), and the upper right the lowest (vice versa). For example, land added is 59
percent higher in high income, low national utility, and 49 percent lower for low income, high
utility in the myopic, low cost, low productivity city.
The point of this table is to compare the myopic and forward looking agents. They are facing
exactly the same states and parameters and differ only in the ability to project the future and
internalize dynamic externalities. As the table shows, this difference is not trivial. The forward-
looking agent is considerably more responsive to the various demand scenarios. For example,
in the low cost, low productivity city, the forward-looking agent adds 86 percent more land in
high income, low utility state instead of the 59 percent difference by the myopic agent. Why?
Intuitively, the forward-looking agent expects the especially high demand states to be temporary
and uses more of his exhaustible resource in the current opportunity. Likewise, he withholds
more land in the low income, high utility demand state than does the myopic agent (-67 percent
compared to -49). This is essentially intertemporal substitution in the timing development of
the exhaustible resource, which the myopic agent cannot do.
Furthermore, heterogeneity in the builder’s primitives matters in the comparison of myopic
and forward looking agents. For a high cost, high productivity city, the gaps between the
agents are smaller (52.6 compared to 43.9, and -41.9 compared to -36.6), because with higher
costs, (i) the agent is more restricted within a single period, and (ii) his continuation value is
lower, diminishing incentives for intertemporal substitution. Thus, the degree of misspecification
could vary by attributes of the agent. Notice also that the myopic agent does not distinguish
between the high and low cost regimes: the upper two blocks and lower two blocks of the panel
are the same for the myopic agent. (There are level differences, but recall the table reports
elasticities abstracting from levels.) Without his internalizing the rising cost, he makes the same
proportional response to changing demand conditions. In contrast, costs affect the forward-
looking agent’s ability to substitute over time, and hence he is more sensitive in the low cost
regime.
The lower panel, exhibiting the elasticities of housing services added (i.e. land plus capi-
tal), shows a similar pattern, but another dimension of comparison arises between myopic and
forward-looking agents. The forward-looking agent is even more sensitive to changing demand
conditions, choosing not only to add more land in good states and withhold in bad, but also
to build more capital-intensively in the good states. This mitigates the burden on future costs
while allowing him to reap the current period’s profits. The myopic agent, however, is too naive
to make the substitution and chooses inputs according to current prices alone; hence, the upper
and lower panels are the same for the myopic agent.
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Table 1: Comparison of Models: Elasticity of Policy Function With Respect to States
Policy Function: Land
Location Parameter States \Model Myopic Dynamic
c φ Res. Utility: Low Med High Low Med High
Income
Low Low Low -10.02 -30.79 -49.52 -2.89 -36.79 -67.07
Med 24.48 0.00 -22.08 40.65 0.00 -36.41
High 59.29 31.06 5.61 86.25 38.87 -3.65
Low High Low -7.42 -22.79 -36.66 -0.64 -27.80 -52.01
Med 18.13 0.00 -16.35 32.75 0.00 -29.30
High 43.90 23.00 4.15 68.40 30.12 -4.20
High Low Low -10.02 -30.79 -49.52 -7.03 -32.36 -55.12
Med 24.48 0.00 -22.08 30.06 0.00 -27.03
High 59.29 31.06 5.61 67.94 33.13 1.80
High High Low -7.42 -22.79 -36.66 -4.23 -24.11 -41.95
Med 18.13 0.00 -16.35 23.68 0.00 -21.28
High 43.90 23.00 4.15 52.61 25.13 0.41
Policy Function: Housing
Location Parameter States \Model Myopic Dynamic
c φ Res. Utility: Low Med High Low Med High
Income
Low Low Low -10.02 -30.79 -49.52 -11.40 -43.26 -70.93
Med 24.48 0.00 -22.08 42.50 0.00 -37.26
High 59.29 31.06 5.61 105.79 51.75 4.11
Low High Low -7.42 -22.79 -36.66 -12.21 -37.65 -59.53
Med 18.13 0.00 -16.35 35.04 0.00 -30.54
High 43.90 23.00 4.15 91.18 45.72 5.79
High Low Low -10.02 -30.79 -49.52 -12.66 -37.04 -58.62
Med 24.48 0.00 -22.08 31.10 0.00 -27.62
High 59.29 31.06 5.61 80.08 41.74 7.62
High High Low -7.42 -22.79 -36.66 -14.82 -33.67 -50.18
Med 18.13 0.00 -16.35 25.36 0.00 -22.36
High 43.90 23.00 4.15 71.53 39.12 10.40
NOTES: The table reports the percent change in the land (upper panel) and housing (lower panel) policy functions (see (6a), (6b)) with respect to
changes in demand conditions for each time-horizon specification of the model. The location/agent is four versions of a generic city, as described in the
main text. There are two demand states, local income and the economy’s reservation utility level, structured in a 3x3 matrix of low/medium/high
states; the differences are taken with respect to the center cells (medium/medium).
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In summary, whether an agent is forward looking or not has consequences for his state-
dependent actions, and in heterogeneous ways depending on the agent’s characteristics. This
serves as motivation for a dynamic model with forward-looking agents. So far, I have regarded
only a partial equilibrium setting. The next section introduces a spatial equilibrium version of
the model of forward-looking agents and discusses associated empirical challenges.
3 The Dynamic Equilibrium Model
I now extend the model to a dynamic spatial equilibrium by relaxing the assumption of an
exogenously fixed reservation utility. In the canonical Roback (1982) model, the level of utility
in the economy, U¯ , is enforced by the free mobility of a sufficiently large set of agents–here, the
consumers/residents–though the source of utility can vary by location (the relative amounts of
consumer goods, housing goods, amenities, etc. in the bundle). The Roback model and many
recent applications of it21 occur in the cross section, in single or repeated snapshots of time.
Yet I suggest that this spatial equilibrium condition is a natural place to incorporate dynamics.
The model above featured a dynamic optimization problem solved by an agent taking U¯ as
transitioning by some exogenous law of motion. An equilibrium version of this model is one
in which U¯ is determined endogenously, perhaps with the single agent having non-negligible
effects on its evolution, but otherwise with a very similar structure. Of course, one needs to
know how the reservation utility evolves over time with states of the economy. I now define the
type of equilibrium the model readily accommodates, and discuss the challenges of empirical
implementation.
3.1 The Equilibrium Definition
Consider the individual agent’s optimization problem rewritten as
Vυ˜(U¯ ,X) = maxx[pi(U¯ ,X, x) + βE(Vυ˜(U¯
′, X ′|U¯ ,X, x))]
U¯ ′ = υ(U¯ , x(υ˜), x−i(υ˜), θ)
X ′ = F (X, x(υ˜), θ)
(11)
where I have split out the notation on the equilibrium object U¯ from the agent’s own state
variables X and defined generic laws of motion for these states. The reservation utility transition
may depend on the agent’s action x and the actions of other agents, x−i, and possibly other
features of the environment collected in θ. Notice that the agents’ actions depend on their belief
21Notably, the Roback model has been extended in various ways by David Albouy and coauthors in Albouy
(2009), Albouy (2012), Albouy and Stuart (2014), Albouy and Ehrlich (2016), Albouy (2016).
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of the law of motion for U¯ . For a rational expectations equilibrium to hold, the actions of
the individual agents must deliver the law motion for U¯ that the agents expect. The rational
expectations equilibrium is
Vυ(U¯ ,X) = maxx[pi(U¯ ,X, x) + βE(Vυ(U¯
′, X ′|U¯ ,X, x))]
U¯ ′ = υ(U¯ , x(υ), x−i(υ), θ)
X ′ = F (X, x(υ), θ)
(12)
The difference between (11) and (12) is that in the latter, the rule the agents use corresponds
to the actual rule, υ˜ = υ. Hereafter, I refer to this as the rational expectations rule, “RER.”
3.2 The Challenge in Practice
The principle is simple enough, but in practice it can be very hard to derive conditions for
the RER, much less the rule itself, especially when agents are heterogeneous and representative
agent techniques would not apply. In spatial contexts, location itself is a form of heterogeneity,
so the difficult cases are hard to avoid.
On the other hand, the spatial equilibrium model is already far simpler than a dynamic game
with the same numbers of agents. Condensing the equilibrium object to a single reservation
utility helps to avoid the intractable curse of dimensionality in a dynamic game in which every
state of every agent enters the value function of each agent. For a large number of agents, such
would be intractable to solve even once for one agent, much less jointly many times for all agents.
Thus, the first insight this paper offers is that the classic spatial equilibrium model is a special
case of dynamic heterogenous agent models where empirics are made feasible by inherent model
conditions.
Still, the model can be troublesome to apply empirically. Consider an economy consisting of
J heterogeneous agents, like the model above. The transition of U¯ will depend on the individual
actions of all the J agents in the economy, which means that J value functions have to be solved
jointly, and the RER υ updated accordingly.22 How does one do this?
Here, I turn to the suggestion of Krusell and Smith (1998): guess a RER, see if it fits, update
that rule until it produces the joint conditions of (12). That is, iterate over functional forms and
parameters until agents acting according to the RER generate the RER they condition upon.
The approximated RER is written as
S(X, θ) ≈ υ(X, θ) (13)
22Even if estimation may be able to avoid full solution of the model, simulation for the purpose of policy
evaluation would require model solution.
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This is a numerical approximation to the “true” solution, much as a discretized or projected
value function iteration is an approximation to the underlying functional equation. But note that
the approximation is not the normalization itself, but its transition. The spatial equilibrium’s
provision of reservation utility is the exact condition for agents in the economy at a point in
time. But, the transition of U¯ could depend on precisely how economic activity is distributed
over the locations–i.e. which agents are facing which states. Hence, using some S in (13) is an
approximation to the true υ, while U¯ is actually the true reservation utility of the model.
In summary, there are two insights. First, by conditioning on no-arbitrage in utility, the
spatial equilibrium model naturally embeds a simplified approach for dynamics. One needs to
be able to solve for the transition of the economy’s utility condition, not a high-dimensional
set of best response functions. The second insight is that well-established numerical techniques
allow one to find the necessary transition rules, to an approximation. The remainder of the
paper will demonstrate an application of this method to the housing builder problem and show
that it is an attractive and reasonable way to incorporate dynamics into empirical applications.
3.3 Application to the Builder’s Problem
I return to the builder’s problem of section 2, but now allowing the reservation utility to be
determined endogenously. The environment is as before, but I must specify how a reservation
utility across locations is obtained.
3.3.1 Defining Reservation Utility
The closed economy of J heterogeneous locations has an aggregate population of P , which
for simplicity will evolve exogenously. In the model’s environment, consumers get utility from
consumption goods, housing and amenities, with budget determined by local income. The stocks
of land and housing and the budget constraints of the various locations evolve over time, and the
suppliers of housing are forward looking about their durable stock. Housing evolves endogenously
and income exogenously, and amenities are assumed fixed.23
The first step in turning the model into a general equilibrium setup is to define how the
reservation utility is determined. The interest of this paper is that the utility comes from within
the closed economy of J locations, and is not determined by, say, some unchanging hinterland
(Glaeser et al. (2014)). This is the more difficult case, as the latter could reduce to a static
condition. I will specify the level of utility offered by the economy to be at the national average
housing services per capita and consumption occurring at the intratemporal optimum for a
consumer at this level of housing, with national amenities are normalized to be zero. That is,
23Amenities need not be fixed, but the model already contains the features essential for the point of this paper.
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U¯ = ln(
1
1 + γ
Y ) + γln(
HN
P
)
where Y is national average income per capita, HN is the level of housing stock nationally, and
P is national population. The reservation utility contains features evolving both exogenously
(Y, P ) and endogenously (HN). To be clear, this is not the only way to impose no spatial
arbitrage, merely one that is empirically convenient.24 Some normalization is necessary, but this
particular one is not.
National utility rises in income and housing stock and falls with population. For an individual
builder in some location j, the price of his housing services output has the following properties.
∂R
∂y
> 0,
∂R
∂Y
< 0,
∂R
∂P
> 0,
∂R
∂HN
< 0
Thus, rents are affected by demand, rising with local income and population but falling in
national average income (because the outside option is higher), and supply, falling with existing
aggregate housing stock. The local housing stock is a component of housing supply, so that
adding housing locally lowers future prices (hence, local stock has a shadow value), but at the
same time, housing added by suppliers in other locations also suppress prices, ceteris paribus.
Individual state variables are the local income and land employed in housing stock. The
economy’s utility evolves according to the transition of national income, population, and the
stock of housing. I assume these are known by the builders of each location, with income and
population following exogenous rules. It will be necessary to find a RER because housing stock
24One obvious alternative would be some reference location, perhaps some amalgamation of regions like rural
lands, small cities collectively, and so on. These and others could serve as suitable normalizations, so long as
one can characterize their evolution. An advantage of using national averages in the closed economy is that local
population shares and rents are defined in closed form as ratios relative to national averages. These are
lnrj =ln
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1 + γ
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+
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γ
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evolves endogenously. With state variables now specified, the builder’s problem is written as
V (y, A, Y, P,HN) = maxa[pi(y, A, Y, P,HN , a) + βE(y
′, A′, Y ′, P ′, H ′N |y, A, Y, P,HN ; a)]
A′ = (1− δ)A+ a
y′ = fy(y, θy)
Y ′ = fY (~y, ~θy)
P ′ = fP (P, θP )
H
′
N = (1− δ)HN + S(Y,HN , P, θH)
(14)
where fy, fY , fP are functions denoting the exogenous laws of motion for incomes and population.
(National income is a function of the vector of local states and laws of motion.) In (14), the
transition functions are general, and functions appropriate to the context can be applied in
practice. The RER is then found using repeated simulation of the model.
3.3.2 Finding the RER
The algorithm for finding the approximated RER S is
1. Start with an initial guess for S0
2. Solve the value functions for each location’s agent conditioning on this guess, obtaining
policy functions ij = Φj(S0) · a(X,S0)
3. Use these policy functions to generate a new law of motion for the endogenous aggregate
state, H
′
N − (1− δ)HN =
∑
j ij(X,S0)
4. Update the RER to S1 ≈
∑
j ij(X,S0)
5. Repeat until convergence in S, i.e. when ‖Sr+1 − Sr‖ <  for some sufficiently small 
Using this algorithm involves first selecting a suitable function for S. Like many numerical
methods, this process takes some trial and error, involving iteration over functional form in
addition to parameters. There are two general guidelines. One is that the enlisted RER have
“small” errors, and the other is simply that the simulated equilibrium matches the data well.
Another possible guideline, of course, is that simplicity is preferred.
The simplest starting point is a linear-in-parameters function which can be easily updated
within a simulation routine. In this environment, the relevant variables are national demand
states (population and income), and national supply (the stock of housing services).25 After
25More variables–say, to account individually for demand states in certain particular locations–can in principle
be included, although these would come at the cost of additional variables in the agent’s state space.
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some specification testing, I found a very simple functional form, S ≡ υ0 + υ1Y + υ2HNP satisfies
each of the guidelines. The predictive power is high, with R2 values in excess of 0.98, and the
model fits well, as will be shown below.
Several methods are available for solving the value functions. Projection methods were
convenient in this case. Computation time was not burdensome. More details are available in
appendix section B.
4 Approximation Quality
An obvious question is then, how bad is the approximation? This question is not easy to answer
completely. The point of the approximation is not merely to speed up computation, but to make
it feasible in the first place. The “true” dynamic equilibrium, where the transition rule depends
on every state of every agent in the economy, is effectively unknowable for all but small collections
of locations. So one cannot simply compare the full and approximate solutions once and proceed
with empirics when the approximation is sufficiently close. However, the approximation quality
can be evaluated to some degree.
There is, first, a conceptual argument for an approximation. Like Krusell and Smith (1998)
and Weintraub et al. (2008), I consider S under a notion of bounded rationality. The full solution
of the model–i.e. solving it like a dynamic game with each agent considering the individual
strategies of all other agents–is not necessarily the most realistic characterization of the way
agents behave. It is not a stretch to believe agents are forward looking, trying to predict future
prices and the impact these have on current actions; however, tracking the states of each player
and trying to anticipate their individual actions is a complicated information problem, even
for sophisticated agents–one they probably not actually doing in the real world. Thus, the full
solution could be more of a red herring than gold standard. The approximation may be closer
to the “truth” in terms of modeling economic behavior.
With that said, I proceed to an quantitative exercise to evaluate how serious is the error
imposed by the approximation. Recall the manner in which condensing of the information in a
spatial equilibrium model is an approximation. In the current period, the aggregate states are
actually what determine prices, so there is no loss of information in their summary. However,
the evolution of these states will depend on how the components are distributed over space. For
example, if there is income growth in a low cost location, the housing stock would grow larger
than if the income shock had occurred in a high cost location. Thus, it is the laws of motion
that contain approximation error.
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4.1 In a Generic Economy
To get a sense of how much error this approximation imposes on an agent’s current period policy
function, I run a series of simulations which hold fixed the aggregate states but perturb their
distribution over space. Agents will choose policies based on their rational expectations law of
motion, and then I compare what their optimal policy would have been had they known exactly
what the next period states would be. The idea is to measure how ignorance of the particular
spatial distribution of the states imposes variance to policy functions.
I first do this in the generic model in order to work in a controlled environment. The agent of
interest is the builder in the generic location, with population of 2.5 million residents and mean
housing services per person of 511 sqf., mean per capita income set to the national average of $
28,500, and parameters of c(A) = 2000A, µ = 0, and φ = 0.0385. The rest of the economy is
drawn to have high and low income (± 25 % of mean), large and small size (50% smaller and
100 % larger), and elastic or inelastic housing supply (c(A) = (2000 ± 100)A). The interaction
of these attributes yields 23 = 8 locations. Another residual location is included to absorb
perturbations to states in order to obtain the same national average; this residual otherwise has
the attributes of the first generic location, and brings the total locations in the economy to ten.
Another economy adds a high and low amenity dimension (µ = ± 0.025), yielding a total of
1 + 24 + 1 = 18 locations in that scenario.
The perturbation exercise varies which of the other locations gets an income shock, but
maintains the same level of national income; that is, it fixes the information that is known
within the approximation, but varies the detail that is lost by not tracking each agent’s states
individually. Measuring the variance in the policy functions is one way to quantify how greatly
the approximation could mischaracterize economic behavior relative to the full model.26
The perturbation exercise proceeds as follows. First I simulate the economy to yield a
baseline rational expectations law of motion for the aggregate endogenous state H. Next, I
find the policy functions for all locations at the mean states. Then, I impose a positive income
shock of size q ∈ {5%, 10%, 25%} to the income of one of the locations, maintaining the national
average by subtracting an appropriately weighted amount of income from the last (10th or 18th)
location, and leaving all other locations at their means. I then evaluate the policy functions at
the perturbation, which may yield an evolution of H different from that expected using the RER.
Finally, I return to the first location to evaluate its policy function had it known the aggregate
state with perfect foresight, having not thrown away information on which location had received
the income shock. The comparison of the two policy functions, i(E(Yt+1), E(Ht+1(S))) versus
26Note that this is a first order perturbation only. That is, the other locations are still operating under the
RER, S. This seems the most appropriate test, as to go further in allowing other locations to behave according
to different rules would require updating the law of motion, which would return the simulation to another slightly
different RER; this would be a comparison of two RERs, not a RER to a non-approximated law of motion.
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i(E(Yt+1), Ht+1), helps to quantify how great is the change in behavior as a function of the lost
information.
Table 2 reports the results of the exercise for the economies of ten and 18 locations for
income shocks of 5%, 10%, and 25%. For brevity, I summarize the differences by groupings of
the locations receiving the income shocks. For example, the first row of the table reports the
mean absolute percentage difference in the policy function when the small, low income locations
(of any elasticity or amenity value) receive the income shock. The lower panel groups by elasticity
and amenity, summarizing over size and income. In the first column of 5% income shocks, the
table shows that the approximated rational expectations policy function and the perfect foresight
policy vary by 0.04 to 0.14 percent, with the larger differences sensibly coming when the large
and elastic locations are recipients of the shock. The differences grow roughly proportionally
with the size of the shocks. When the economy expands to 18 locations, the differences drop
considerably–falling more than 50 percent–because each individual location contributes less to
the aggregate law of motion. This highlights that the approximation should perform better as
the number of locations grows.
Comparing this table with Table 1, one can see that the potential error introduced by the ap-
proximation is orders of magnitude smaller than the differences between the static and dynamic
models. The static and dynamic models in Table 1 are in many cases 20-40 percentage points
apart, while in Table 2, the differences are less than a percentage point. This suggests there is
far more potential for model bias in assuming myopia than forward-looking bounded rationality.
Moreover, the issue of forward-looking behavior versus myopia is present in a single agent model
and does not dissipate with more agents, whereas the errors of the dynamic approximation do
dissipate as the number of locations grows.
4.2 Using U.S. Data
Continuing in this line of thinking, I also conduct perturbation exercises in a more realistic
setting, using the economy on which the model is estimated. The data and estimation routine
are described in the next section and appendix A. For now, it suffices to state that the model is
estimated using the 49 largest metro areas in the U.S., with all other smaller metros aggregated
into a residual fiftieth location.
As in Table 2, I evaluate the policy function at the mean of the states in the data as well as
at perturbations of those states, constrained so that the national aggregates remain fixed, and
then compare the policy functions. Instead of using the controlled environment of one income
shock shock to one city at a time, I draw a full set of income shocks, positive and negative in the
bounds [−q, q], to J − 2 cities. The left out cities are the location of interest (i.e. the one whose
policy function I am comparing) and the residual location, which absorbs the net change to the
national aggregate. This more directly corresponds to the performance of the approximation
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Table 2: Approximation Error in a Generic Model: Mean Absolute Percentage Differences to
Policy Functions, by Location Receiving the Shock (%)
Economy: Ten Locations 18 Locations
Perturb. Size: 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.25
Attributes of
Perturbed Location
Size Income
Small Low 0.098 0.203 0.562 0.017 0.036 0.098
Small High 0.044 0.093 0.262 0.020 0.040 0.103
Large Low 0.110 0.227 0.608 0.023 0.047 0.123
Large High 0.140 0.105 0.268 0.017 0.041 0.103
Supply Amenity
Elastic Low 0.109 0.137 0.390 0.023 0.053 0.139
Elastic High - - - 0.023 0.046 0.119
Inelastic Low 0.087 0.177 0.460 0.011 0.023 0.061
Inelastic High - - - 0.021 0.042 0.109
NOTES: The table reports the percent deviation in the policy functions between that using the approximated rational expectations equilibrium and the
perfect foresight outcome. The economies are organized of generic locations as described in the main text, with two size economies present. The
experiment changes which underlying receives a positive demand shock, holding fixed the aggregate states, and the table reports means over collections
of recipient locations.
in an actual empirical setting, where there would be various shocks to many locations at once,
while the agent continues to track only the aggregates.
The perturbation performed many times in loops: 100 perturbations for each of the J − 1
locations of interest (the residual locale is omitted from study), for both income shocks and
changes to the distribution of the housing stock. I report the mean absolute percentage difference
over the 100 perturbation draws for each location and state variable. The complete list of
locations is reported in appendix Table C1, but for brevity, I summarize by location type in
Table 3.
There are some mildly interesting differences between types of locations–for instance, large
and elastic locations are more sensitive to the approximation error–but the punchline of the
table is in the units themselves. The average differences between the approximation and perfect
foresight policy functions are of the order 10−6 percentage points. While the errors from Table
2 were small, these are many times smaller yet because of the greater number of locations (50,
instead of 18 or ten), and the fact that the simultaneous local shocks cancel out each other. In
other words, for every elastically supplied city with a positive income shock, there is another
with a negative shock, and the RER performs well on average.27
In summary, while using the RER approximation introduces some potential for error, the
differences are much smaller than those between dynamic and myopic specifications. Moreover,
the approximation performs better and better as the number of locations grows, just as the
27To this point, notice that the variance of the shock draws is nearly irrelevant.
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Table 3: Approximation Error in The Estimated Model: Mean Absolute Percentage Differences
to Policy Functions, by Location of Interest (% 10−6)
Perturb. State: Income Housing Stock
Perturb. Size: 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.25
Attributes of
Interest Location
All All 0.523 0.530 0.554 0.276 0.276 0.277
Size Income
Small Low 0.338 0.342 0.358 0.178 0.178 0.179
Small High 0.473 0.479 0.502 0.250 0.250 0.250
Large Low 0.240 0.244 0.255 0.127 0.127 0.127
Large High 0.812 0.823 0.859 0.429 0.429 0.429
Supply Amenity
Elastic Low 0.317 0.355 0.370 0.185 0.185 0.185
Elastic High 0.543 0.530 0.553 0.276 0.276 0.276
Inelastic Low 0.618 0.698 0.730 0.363 0.364 0.364
Inelastic High 0.530 0.512 0.536 0.267 0.267 0.267
NOTES: The table reports the average percent deviation in the policy functions between that using the approximated rational expectations equilibrium
and the perfect foresight outcome. The economy is the 50 location U.S. metro area model deriving from actual data. The experiment holds fixed the
aggregate states and then randomly draws shocks to the distribution of the states across locations. The simulation takes means over 100 independent
draws for each city, and the table reports means over groups of city types. The full results for each city are available in appendix Table C1.
full solution would be getting harder. In contrast, the concerns over model specification would
be present even in a one-agent partial equilibrium model. Thus, a dynamic model with an
approximate numerical solution is not only feasible, but desirable.
5 Estimation Overview
This section briefly describes the input data and how the example model is solved and estimated.
While the details are important the estimation of this particular model, they are not essential
to the general point of how to implement dynamic spatial equilibrium models of this class, so
the detailed discussion is relegated to appendix section A. Here I provide a brief overview to fix
ideas, and explain where the routine for solving the rational expectations equilibrium enters.
5.1 Data
The level of geography is the metropolitan area as given by the U.S. Census definition of Core-
Based Statistical Area (CBSA). I focus on the 49 largest CBSAs by 2000 Census population and
aggregate all others into a single residual location.28 Identified cities comprise approximately
28Fifty is an arbitrary number of locations that seemed a reasonably large cross section without beginning
to confront data availability issues in smaller cities. Estimation need not be constrained to 50. The smallest
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two-thirds the national urban population, and the residual the remaining third. Key pieces of
data are unavailable for rural areas, so these are excluded.
Data on housing stock, construction, and population comes from the U.S. Census, focusing
on the period 1980-2011. Information on local incomes derive from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Materials costs for home construction are obtained from the RS Means Company, a
construction data analytics firm.
An important component of the data concerns the relative factor intensities for land and
capital. These derive from detailed microdata on the stock of housing in U.S. metro areas as of
2012. County tax assessor records list the living area, lot size, and year of construction of every
single family home in metropolitan counties, so I can measure densities by location and vintage.
5.2 Estimation
Some parameters can be calibrated outside the model, including the transitions of income and
national population, and the utility parameters γ and µ which can be derived from the model’s
spatial equilibrium conditions. The discount rate β is set to 0.95 and the depreciation parameter
δ comes from an autoregression using the time series of housing stocks in the U.S.
The primitive cost parameters are estimated using simulation of the model, targeting moment
conditions for each city derived from the living area/lot size data. Intuitively, the assembly cost
parameters are identified from the level of land exercised in a period conditional on output
prices (i.e. observed supply elasticity), and parameters governing input factor intensities from
the density of construction, which is observed to vary with prices and land stocks. The most
flexible, well-identified function for cost parameters set the convexity parameter ν = 1, and
estimated two parameters of c(A) = c1 + c2Ajt,which are constrained to be nonnegative. The
housing production TFP parameter φ is estimated, setting ρ and κ a priori (more details available
in appendix A).
The estimation begins with the RER as measured from the time series in the data, and then
updates internally. In the first iteration, I use S0 from the data, estimate the parameters for each
location, and then simulate the model to general a new aggregate series. I then run a regression
to update the parameters of the RER to S1, re-estimate the model for each city, and repeat
until the parameters of the locations’ primitives and the RER can no longer be updated. Since
this is a numerical technique, there is no general proof of convergence or uniqueness, but the
model has properties indicating it will indeed converge, namely that more housing supply reduces
continuation value (VH < 0). In words, the routine converges because if the RER predicts more
housing services added, the individual locations add less, which will decrease the next iteration’s
specified cities in my data are Salt Lake City, UT and Rochester, NY; the largest to be aggregated to the residual
location are Bridgeport, CT and Tulsa, OK. New Orleans, LA is excluded because of the disruption to housing
stock and construction caused by Hurricane Katrina.
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predicted housing services in RER, which will increase the individual agents’ construction, and
so on until these balance in equilibrium.
5.3 The Myopic Model
Estimation of the myopic model proceeds much like the dynamic, of course without the steps
related to solving the value functions. There is still an equilibrium that needs to be solved for,
in that the myopic builders must agree on the stock of housing services at any point in time.
The simulated model must deliver the predicted sequence of housing services, period by period.
6 Comparing Model Specifications
6.1 Model Fit
One immediate way to compare two models is to “horserace” them and evaluate their ability
to fit the observed data. The following subsection briefly compares the ability of each model to
match data. Fit is certainly an important evaluation of any model, but it turns out not to be
the major distinction between the myopic and dynamic model.
Figure 1 presents a series of plots measuring the fit of each model. The top panel contains
scatter plots (a and b) for the choice variables of interest, land inputs and housing services
(living area). On the horizontal axis are the actual values of land and housing added for each
city in the estimation period, and the vertical plots the models’ predicted values, with dynamic
model values denoted with a circle and the myopic an “×.” All values line up very nearly along
the diagonal, indicating that both models are capable of matching the ample cross-sectional
variation in the level of construction. Note that this happens independently for housing services
and land. In the middle panel, plot c shows their ratio (the density of construction) is also fit
well within each model. The ability of the models to fit these moments is not surprising given
the large degree of flexibility and locational heterogeneity present in both.
A difference between models emerges, however, when considering the change in density within
each city over time. In most locations, construction density increased from the 1980s to 2000s.
The dynamic model naturally embeds a mechanism for this: as the option value of land increases,
builders use less of it for a given amount of housing. Hence, densities rise when demand is
anticipated to be high (e.g. income growth) or when land costs rise (e.g. land is exhausted).
Plot d shows the dynamic model’s land/capital tradeoff within a given city is consistent with
the data, if a bit understated on average. The myopic model contains no such mechanism, and
therefore has constant density throughout, missing this feature of the data.
The bottom panel plots the distribution of the estimator’s objective function, mean squared
error in housing construction and density, across locations. As the top panel suggested, the two
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Figure 1: Comparison of Models’ Fit to Data
NOTES: The figure displays several plots evaluating the fit of the myopic and dynamic specifications of the housing construction model. Plots a− d
plot actual versus model-predicted values of the land and housing services policies. Plots e, f show the distribution of the objective functions across
locations.
models are similar in terms of ability to fit total housing construction, and also their respective
“misses” (instances of higher error) are similar. The dynamic model does better in fitting the
density distribution for the reasons just mentioned.
In summary, each model is flexible enough to match data. Though the myopic model misses
a key feature of the evolution of density, this difference need not be too alarming on its own. If a
researcher were concerned about this moment but nothing else about forward-looking behavior,
some ad hoc adjustment to the myopic model could be made by, say, adding a density parameter
as a function of states or time, φ(A, t, Y ) etc. Interpretation of parameters and counterfactual
simulation, discussed next, are more fundamental concerns.
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6.2 Estimates
Difference in fit is likely a surmountable concern, especially in a flexible model that can target
several moments in the data. A deeper question is whether the parameters are the “right” ones,
which obviously is especially important if one takes the parameters themselves seriously–to
do, say, interpretation of the coefficients and conduct counterfactual exercises. Recent literature
comparing dynamic and static/myopic models has focused on proper interpretation of coefficients
(see Murphy and Bishop (2016), Bishop (2008), Ma (2016)).
In this case, though the models may both target the same moments and succeed similarly in
fitting the data, they do so at different parameters values. Table 4 reports coefficient estimates,
city-by-city, in the dynamic and myopic specifications, with means and medians across cities
in the bottom rows. (Appendix Table C2 reports the coefficient estimates with their standard
errors.) There are too many parameters to discuss everything, but some patterns are worth
highlighting. First, the myopic model is far more likely to arrive at the zero constraint for the
c2 parameters that governs how assembly costs change with used land stock. This is sensible
because it is that parameter is most sensitive to decision horizon. In a dynamic model, expec-
tations of future costs affect land developed in all states of the world, affecting construction
densities and levels and their variance with local prices, so that many locations are permitted
to exhibit fluctuations in land developed (through density or withholding of options). Only
characteristically elastic markets in the central U.S. and some low demand Rust Belt cities ar-
rive at the zero constraint for this parameter. In the myopic model, in contrast, the parameter
only has bite in locations where housing service supply elasticities appear to be declining with
urban growth (some characteristically constrained coastal markets). Second, this difference in
finding c2 has effects on the estimated levels of TFP (φ), as average productivity estimates
must be higher to rationalize density without an option value to land. Third, the two sets of
estimates differ in their average levels. A simple way to see this is to compare the sum of the
mean c1, c2 parameters. The myopic model on average needs higher cost parameters to arrive at
the appropriate level of construction activity because it lacks an option value component that
rationalizes retention of land; with myopia, all reluctance is ascribed to current period costs. If
one were trying to interpret these coefficients as indicative of underlying cost mechanisms–for
instance, land use or building regulations or geographic constraints–these differences in model
specification could alter the conclusions about the import of these mechanisms on costs.
Thus, one’s assumptions about model horizon could impact interpretation of parameters
estimates, which can matter because it can affect prediction within and outside the model’s
environment. I proceed to a comparison of the model’s elasticity estimates within the regime on
which the models are estimated, and then close the section by looking at counterfactual policy
scenarios.
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates, Dynamic and Myopic Model
Dynamic Myopic
Location c1 c2 φ c1 c2 φ
Residual 50.65 0.00 0.036 61.74 0.00 0.035
New York, NY 391.86 272.71 0.051 384.60 594.43 0.102
Los Angeles, CA 791.63 404.24 0.119 1,302.84 0.00 0.207
Chicago, IL 1,210.51 66.39 0.090 1,323.06 0.00 0.103
Philadelphia, PA 1,504.18 1,080.85 0.048 2,422.37 823.78 0.099
Dallas, TX 867.75 0.00 0.109 897.40 0.00 0.120
Miami, FL 1,938.75 379.63 0.131 2,464.88 0.00 0.205
Washington, DC 1,908.93 574.73 0.043 2,871.82 0.00 0.069
Houston, TX 1,030.19 0.00 0.129 1,068.06 0.00 0.148
Detroit, MI 1,679.75 195.16 0.055 1,946.13 0.00 0.060
Boston, MA 820.90 532.67 0.030 680.14 1,560.40 0.047
Atlanta, GA 569.81 118.65 0.045 790.05 0.00 0.054
San Francisco, CA 3,327.91 767.47 0.120 3,103.85 1,425.82 0.262
Riverside, CA 1,119.79 99.62 0.137 1,250.38 0.00 0.156
Phoenix, AZ 1,069.66 54.71 0.157 1,164.79 0.00 0.188
Seattle, WA 1,427.67 684.99 0.053 2,633.32 0.00 0.091
Minneapolis, MN 1,985.25 514.14 0.028 2,365.39 545.44 0.034
San Diego, CA 3,434.07 0.00 0.061 3,352.63 0.00 0.055
St Louis, MO 1,849.55 494.53 0.040 2,595.67 0.00 0.047
Baltimore, MD 5,439.27 1,540.71 0.046 6,163.50 1,959.02 0.083
Pittsburgh, PA 1,696.63 617.02 0.039 1,974.76 925.10 0.051
Tampa, FL 1,810.58 409.94 0.104 2,447.20 0.00 0.153
Denver, CO 3,063.77 252.02 0.071 3,586.74 0.00 0.094
Cleveland, OH 3,086.83 0.00 0.061 3,175.75 0.00 0.065
Cincinnati, OH 2,042.03 270.32 0.043 2,580.14 0.00 0.050
Portland, OR 1,634.19 388.27 0.074 2,499.14 0.00 0.111
Kansas City, MO 1,827.31 306.40 0.082 2,287.92 0.00 0.097
Sacramento, CA 1,574.20 808.76 0.079 2,675.79 0.00 0.116
San Jose, CA 3,619.89 6,497.68 0.073 0.00 13,457.61 0.240
San Antonio, TX 2,331.34 0.00 0.077 2,380.11 0.00 0.082
Orlando, FL 2,053.09 160.92 0.103 2,358.31 0.00 0.129
Columbus, OH 3,567.07 0.00 0.052 3,661.03 0.00 0.055
Providence, RI 1,505.23 518.74 0.034 756.20 2,255.66 0.042
Norfolk, VA 3,662.13 0.00 0.086 3,752.58 0.00 0.096
Indianapolis, IN 1,961.37 517.60 0.055 2,844.66 0.00 0.069
Milwaukee, WI 8,425.35 0.00 0.102 8,642.09 0.00 0.118
Las Vegas, NV 2,463.65 198.66 0.199 2,762.52 0.00 0.281
Charlotte, NC 1,546.42 826.09 0.054 2,784.16 0.00 0.074
Nashville, TN 1,504.63 508.62 0.028 2,658.72 0.00 0.034
Austin, TX 2,752.60 0.00 0.098 2,768.05 0.00 0.100
Memphis, TN 3,304.04 0.00 0.042 3,454.39 0.00 0.044
Buffalo, NY 4,933.48 0.00 0.035 4,995.04 0.00 0.035
Louisville, KY 2,276.97 0.00 0.017 2,183.32 0.00 0.017
Hartford, CT 3,657.74 716.66 0.035 4,992.54 0.00 0.040
Jacksonville, FL 3,683.06 831.22 0.087 4,962.18 0.00 0.125
Richmond, VA 3,456.80 0.00 0.034 3,386.32 0.00 0.033
Oklahoma City, OK 3,712.27 0.00 0.043 3,761.60 0.00 0.043
Birmingham, AL 1,367.04 518.63 0.020 3,498.89 0.00 0.023
Rochester, NY 7,866.75 0.00 0.027 7,924.39 0.00 0.027
Salt Lake City, UT 10,271.21 48.11 0.138 10,289.71 0.00 0.138
Mean 2,581.51 443.54 0.070 2,897.74 470.95 0.095
Median 1,950.06 261.17 0.055 2,614.49 0.00 0.082
NOTES: The table reports the parameter estimates for each location under the dynamic and myopic specifications of the model. The full description of
the data and estimation routine are in appendix A. Appendix Table C2 reports the coefficients with standard errors.
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6.3 Predicted Elasticities
Table 5 repeats the exercise of Table 1, comparing the policy functions of myopic and dynamic
models in response to changes in demand. The three-by-three block structure of the table is
as before, reporting elasticities to the demand shocks, which here are one standard deviation
changes to local and national income. All other states held at their means, and the center cell
is zero by construction. Note there are a few differences in context from the initial table. The
model is now in general equilibrium, and the parameters are the estimates for actual cities as
reported in Table 4. For brevity, I highlight just a few example cities, San Francisco, New York,
Boston, and Austin, TX.
In both types of models, construction and land exercised respond to the changes in demand,
with the high local income, low national income case being the greatest increase to local relative
demand. Naturally, elasticities are larger in more elastically supplied (lower c1, c2) locations.
However, the models differ in their predictions on the the size of the response–and in which
dimension–depending on the conditions of the city in question. San Francisco, with high assembly
costs but relatively high productivity (as governed by φ), shows large differences between myopic
and dynamic models in predictions on the amount of land used; in the dynamic model, the
response to higher demand comes at greater density, as scarce land is withheld for future use. In
Boston, with lower housing productivity but lower assembly costs, the gaps in land use are small
but differences in construction amounts are large. In New York, there are some of both effects.
The sizes can be as large as 10 percentage points despite differing only in the model’s specified
horizon, which I emphasize again is many orders of magnitude larger than approximation errors
found in Table 3. Now, in Austin, the two model’s predictions are quite similar. There, the two
models have very similar parameters, including the estimated change in land costs parameter,
c2, approaching the zero constraint. Thus, the dynamic model is nearly the same as the static,
and the models deliver similar predictions for that city.
These are a few examples, and differences across cities run the gamut.29 As before, the
takeaway is that the differences in prediction and the potential misspecification can vary with
attributes of the agents. Researchers must be especially cautious of time horizon assumptions
in models with rich spatial heterogeneity, where the biases imposed in one place may not apply
to the same extent in another.
6.4 Simulations
Often, models of this class are used to evaluate hypothetical policy regimes and states of the
world. The potentially most serious difference between dynamic and myopic models comes in
29It is not the case, for example, that all large, or elastic, or productive cities respond the same way. There
are other central U.S. cities (including Texas) with nontrivial differences between myopic and dynamic models.
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Table 5: Comparison of Models: Elasticity of Policy Function in Estimated Model
Policy Function: Land
States \Model Myopic Dynamic
City Params. Natl Inc.: Low Med High Low Med High
(dynamic) Local Inc.
San Francisco c1 = 3, 327.91 Low -20.69 -21.70 -22.56 -11.70 -13.02 -14.15
c2 = 767.47 Med 1.21 0.00 -1.03 1.39 0.00 -1.20
φ = 0.1198 High 23.30 21.89 20.70 13.32 11.85 10.58
Boston c1 = 820.90 Low -27.18 -28.50 -29.62 -29.18 -31.29 -33.08
c2 = 532.67 Med 1.58 0.00 -1.35 2.33 0.00 -1.99
φ = 0.0297 High 30.59 28.75 27.18 30.83 28.28 26.11
New York c1 = 391.86 Low -25.23 -26.47 -27.51 -22.18 -23.88 -25.31
c2 = 272.71 Med 1.49 0.00 -1.26 1.89 0.00 -1.58
φ = 0.0510 High 28.47 26.71 25.23 23.40 21.32 19.59
Austin c1 = 2, 752.60 Low -24.02 -25.18 -26.18 -24.18 -25.30 -26.25
c2 ≈ 0 Med 1.38 0.00 -1.19 1.33 0.00 -1.13
φ = 0.0984 High 27.01 25.40 24.02 27.10 25.56 24.24
Policy Function: Housing
States \Model Myopic Dynamic
City Params. Natl Inc.: Low Med High Low Med High
(dynamic) Local Inc.
San Francisco c1 = 3, 327.91 Low -20.69 -21.70 -22.56 -21.30 -22.40 -23.34
c2 = 767.47 Med 1.21 0.00 -1.03 1.32 0.00 -1.12
φ = 0.1198 High 23.30 21.89 20.70 24.27 22.73 21.42
Boston c1 = 820.90 Low -27.18 -28.50 -29.62 -34.54 -36.49 -38.16
c2 = 532.67 Med 1.58 0.00 -1.35 2.35 0.00 -2.00
φ = 0.0297 High 30.59 28.75 27.18 40.06 37.31 34.98
New York c1 = 391.86 Low -25.23 -26.47 -27.51 -29.52 -31.11 -32.45
c2 = 272.71 Med 1.49 0.00 -1.26 1.95 0.00 -1.64
φ = 0.0510 High 28.47 26.71 25.23 34.17 31.84 29.90
Austin c1 = 2, 752.60 Low -24.02 -25.18 -26.18 -24.08 -25.24 -26.23
c2 ≈ 0 Med 1.38 0.00 -1.19 1.38 0.00 -1.18
φ = 0.0984 High 27.01 25.40 24.02 27.06 25.46 24.08
NOTES: The table reports the percent change in the land (upper panel) and housing (lower panel) policy functions (see (6a), (6b)) with respect to
changes in demand conditions for each time-horizon specification of the model. Unlike Table 1, these are derived from the equilibrium model (not single
agent) using estimates from actual U.S. data. There are four example locations reported; more results available upon request. There are two demand
states, local and national income, structured in a 3x3 matrix of low/medium/high states; the differences are taken with respect to the center cells
(medium/medium).
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counterfactual simulation, when the researcher must put more faith in the quality of the model
and has less discipline from actual data. This section demonstrates the differences between
the dynamic and myopic models in various policy scenarios. The point of these exercises is to
illustrate how the models differ and when and how severely using the wrong model will affect the
predicted answer. The simulations are examples of the types of policies that might be evaluated
with a model like this, but do not attempt seriously to answer any specific policy questions.
Each simulation will compare policy functions from the counterfactual scenario to a baseline
using the estimated parameters (and RER for the dynamic model) from the data. For the
dynamic model, a new RER and associated value functions must be found for the new policy
regime. The simulations begin with all locations at their mean states (Aj, Hj, y,HN , Y ) and then
simulate forward for ten periods (years). Each simulation produces a lot of data, so for brevity
I present the results for some archetypal cities. The results present, heuristically speaking, a
difference-in-difference evaluation of the models: the difference between models in the difference
within the models’ baseline and counterfactual simulations. The question is, how do the models
predict changes in the agents’ behaviors as their environments change?
6.4.1 A Tax on Housing Output
The first simulation is a tax on new housing services constructed by the builder. That is, the
builder’s return function becomes (1−τ)Rtji. This could represent an actual tax on revenues, or
an implicit one, such as a regulation that builders set aside some portion of their new construction
to be sold below market value, in that the supplier adds some quantity of housing services i but
receives only a fraction 1 − τ of the revenue.30 The tax is assumed the same magnitude in all
locations for simplicity of exposition, and is set to τ = 0.1.
Figure 2 displays the results for a selection of locations: a large, high rent, and inelastically
supplied market, New York, and a smaller one, San Francisco, and a large, low rent, elastically
supplied market, Atlanta, and a smaller one, Nashville. The figure displays the relative policy
function under the counterfactual scenario plotted over the ten years of simulation; for example,
a position of -0.1 indicates that there is ten percent less construction under the counterfactual
than in the baseline. The upper panel plots housing services added, and the lower plots land
used in construction of those housing services. The dynamic model is plotted in a blue solid line
and the myopic in a green dashed line.
The direct effect of the policy is obvious–all locations build less in all periods. The initial
impact is slightly larger than ten percent, with larger effects in the more elastic markets where
densities are lower and materials are a higher share of costs.31 As time progresses, each market
30This simulation is intended to mimic in a generic way an “affordable housing” policy imposed on builders.
31This can be seen by comparing the analytical relative policy functions,
(1−τ)R−cc− c
φ˜
+ ∂V∂h
R−cc− c
φ˜
+ ∂V∂h
. Of course, prices
and continuation values change between the counterfactual and baseline.
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“bounces back” to some degree, since relatively higher housing prices result from the reduced
supply remaining from initial construction levels. (Both dynamic and myopic specifications are
equilibrium models, after all.) The bounce-back is larger in the more elastic markets.
Qualitatively, these effects are by design common to the myopic and dynamic models, though
quantitative differences emerge in heterogeneous ways across markets. First, there are large
differences between the models in the amount of land employed, seen in a comparison of the
upper and lower panels of the figure. In the myopic model, the reduction is proportional to the
change in housing services. In the dynamic model, the reduction is much smaller because the tax
reduces option values, and land becomes less dear, so more is used than would be in the no-tax
baseline; so, buildings are less dense. The gap between models is greatest in the most land
constrained markets, where land option values have larger import (greater VA) for the policy
functions. The second difference (a by-product of the first) is that the counterfactual affects
housing services less severely in the dynamic model. The direct effect is to build less, but the
indirect effect is that land is less valuable, so more is used, causing a rebound in housing services
offered. This rebound effect is more pronounced in the more elastic markets, where the builders’
value functions are higher since the flow of future dividends is larger (through higher quantities
and lower costs, not higher prices).32 Hence the gap between the myopic and dynamic models
in housing services is larger for the more elastic markets. In San Francisco, the housing service
policies are effectively overlapped, though with the intercept gap in the land policy functions.
In Atlanta and Nashville, the difference in slope between models drives the predicted housing
services policies apart.
The takeaway is that though the policy’s direction of impact is clear, empirical predictions
can depend on which type of model is used. The dynamic and myopic models can differ in the
effect on choice variables (factor intensities) and their indirect effects of construction levels, but
in ways that are heterogeneous between markets and over time.33
6.4.2 An Increase to Regulatory Burden
The next example simulation returns to a no-tax regime but considers an increase in the per
period cost to housing construction, the assembly cost parameters c1, c2. This reduces supply
elasticity by making it more difficult to add housing in a given period, and is intended to
represent, for instance, larger regulatory burdens on construction. Again for simplicity I use a
common magnitude of ten percent increase across all locations.
Figure 3 uses the same organization and archetypal cities as the last simulation. In the
32That value functions are lower in places with high rents may be counterintuitive. This is a consequence of
modeling the agent as a developer-builder, and a single entity per metro area, not separate agents controlling
individual parcels. It is better to be the developer of all of Atlanta than all of San Francisco, since the new
market size is greater.
33Of course, a heterogeneous policy like taxes that vary between markets would only complicate things further.
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Figure 2: Changes to Policy Function in Builder Tax Simulation: Dynamic and Myopic Models
(proportional differences over t periods)
Housing
Land
NOTES: The figure plots policy function responses to a uniform housing tax on builders under both the dynamic and model specifications of the
model. The vertical axis reports the proportional change (e.g. −0.1 = 10% lower) and the horizontal is the time elapsed since the change was
instituted. Separate panels report the land and housing policy responses. See the main text for details of the simulation. Four example
locations/agents are reported, and more results are available upon request.
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myopic model, the cost increase has identical initial impact across cities and factor inputs. The
degree of bounce back (from low initial supply leading to housing price increases in later periods)
is similar across cities, but to a slightly steeper degree in larger and more elastic places. The
dynamic model shows greater richness in the effects. As in the housing tax simulation, the impact
on land is smaller, since the option value is lower and therefore the builders are less apt to retain
it. The gap between models in land used is larger in the land constrained cities (New York,
San Francisco). The greater willingness to use land, the indirect effect, means that the impact
on housing is smaller in the dynamic model than in the static, though the gap between models
can vary significantly based on density; the higher housing TFP places (e.g. San Francisco)
have less gap than lower TFP (e.g. Nashville), since using relatively more land does not lead
to that much more housing in San Francisco, while it does in Nashville. The dynamic model
also exhibits heterogeneity between cities in the degree of bounce back over time, depending
on the contribution of the land stock-dependent element c2 versus c1 parameter to per-period
assembly costs (see values in Table 4). Those with more land stock dependence of costs (New
York, Nashville) react more to the lower levels of stock in later periods.
In summary, like the tax simulation, the direction of the effect on housing services is obvious
and qualitatively similar between the two models, but quantitative differences emerge in ways
heterogeneous between locations.
6.4.3 A Change in Location Amenities
The next simulation looks at altering location demand by changing the relative amenity param-
eters µj. Specifically, I reduce the amenity parameter of each city located on an ocean coast
(Atlantic, Pacific, or Gulf of Mexico) by one standard deviation of 0.0276. This could represent
a world in which coastal location is relatively less attractive because of, say, increased risk of
storms or flooding brought on by climate change.
Like the previous simulations, this change to primitives requires a new solution of value
functions and finding the associated RER. Unlike previous simulations, the change in parameters
applies to only a subset of locations, though each will be affected in equilibrium. The simulation
again starts from the mean values of location’s states and walks forward ten periods. I swap
out two archetypal cities in order to display a high rent, inelastically supplied coastal location
(New York), and a low rent, elastically supplied one (Jacksonville, FL), and then a high rent,
inelastically supplied inland city (Chicago) and low rent, elastically supplied one (Atlanta).
Figure 4 displays the results. Reduced demand for coastal locations leads to lower construc-
tion there. In equilibrium, inland locations see an increase in residual demand, so construction
increases there. In the myopic model, the changes to housing and land employed are the same,
whereas in the dynamic model, we again see the effect of option values–the changes to land
employed are smaller in magnitude than housing. This can have varied indirect effects on hous-
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Figure 3: Changes to Policy Function in Regulatory Burden Simulation: Dynamic and Myopic
Models (proportional differences over t periods)
Housing
Land
NOTES: The figure plots policy function responses to an increase to the assembly cost parameters (c1, c2) under both the dynamic and model
specifications of the model. The vertical axis reports the proportional change (e.g. −0.1 = 10% lower) and the horizontal is the time elapsed since the
change was instituted. Separate panels report the land and housing policy responses. See the main text for details of the simulation. Four example
locations/agents are reported, and more results are available upon request.
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ing construction, depending on the location’s parameters. In the elastic locations (Jacksonville
and Atlanta), the land effect mitigates the changes to housing. In the inelastic ones (New York
and Chicago), the changes to building density actually amplify (to a small degree) the effect on
housing.
Like the supply side interventions above, the qualitative effects are mechanically similar
between the two models, but the quantitative effects can in some instances be quite different.
The dynamic model exhibits a richness the myopic one lacks when the general equilibrium
imposes substitution effects from dynamic externalities.
6.4.4 A Change in Location Housing Stocks
The final simulation is the most simple. The thought experiment is a sudden loss of housing
stock in eastern coastal locations,34 resulting from, say, a catastrophic event like a hurricane. For
simplicity, I use the same ten percent loss in all East Coast locations.35 To make ceteris paribus
comparisons, I assume the loss in stock does not affect the primitive cost of land assembly
nor demand for the locations through, for instance, the amenity parameters or total urban
population. Thus, instead of changing parameters or other primitives, this simulation merely
changes state variables, so the value functions and RER need not be updated. Therefore, the
housing and land effects are identical within the dynamic model as well as the myopic, so I only
report the results for housing services. The initial states are at the means, except for the loss of
housing stock in affected cities.
Figure 5 reports the results for two directly affected cities, New York and Boston, and two
unaffected, San Francisco and Atlanta. There is nationally a rebuilding effort since demand for
housing remains, so all places see an uptick in construction that wanes over time as stock returns.
The rebuilding is greatest in the coastal locations which have newly available land. However,
this newly available land comes with newly available option value which mutes the rebuilding
response. Thus, the rebuilding under the dynamic model is less than the myopic model, where
it is effectively proportional to the loss. This insight highlights the potential importance of path
persistence in models with durable capital that myopic specifications do not capture.
7 Conclusion
This paper suggests a path forward for incorporating dynamics into empirical spatial equilib-
rium models. The main insight is that models with spatial indifference already embed a natural
starting point for incorporating dynamics: the level of reservation utility can be treated as a
34Results for other coasts and catastrophes are available upon request for those feeling dismal.
35These are, by size: New York, Philadelphia, Washington DC, Boston, Baltimore, Providence, Norfolk, and
Jacksonville.
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Figure 4: Changes to Policy Function in Coastal Amenity Simulation: Dynamic and Myopic
Models (proportional differences over t periods)
Housing
Land
NOTES: The figure plots policy function responses after a change to the amenity value of coastal located cities under both the dynamic and model
specifications of the model. The vertical axis reports the proportional change (e.g. −0.1 = 10% lower) and the horizontal is the time elapsed since the
change was instituted. Separate panels report the land and housing policy responses. See the main text for details of the simulation. Four example
locations/agents are reported, and more results are available upon request.
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Figure 5: Changes to Policy Function in Coastal Stock Loss Simulation: Dynamic and Myopic
Models (proportional differences over t periods)
Housing
NOTES: The figure plots policy function responses to a capital loss in east coast cities under both the dynamic and model specifications of the model.
The vertical axis reports the proportional change (e.g. −0.1 = 10% lower) and the horizontal is the time elapsed since the change was instituted. See
the main text for details of the simulation. Four example locations/agents are reported, and more results are available upon request.
state variable. This evades a potentially very complicated curse of dimensionality in spatial
models with heterogeneity. The second insight is that existing techniques for solving rational
expectations models can be readily applied to empirically implement dynamic spatial equilib-
rium models. The paper demonstrates the techniques on a relevant example of an economy
of interrelated heterogeneous housing suppliers, showing that approximation errors are small
and illustrating how dynamic and myopic specifications of the same model can depart from one
another.
It would be nice if researchers had some rule of thumb that a dynamic model will always have,
say, effects ten percent larger or smaller, etc., but it is clear that no such rule exists in general.
The gap between model specifications can vary by context, by the attributes of the agent in
question, and over time as the states evolve. Thus, researchers are left to do the hard work of
solving dynamic equilibrium models in order to have confidence in the empirical predictions.
This paper aims to offer good news in this regard. While full solutions for economies of
heterogeneous markets may quickly become infeasible, approximation techniques are readily
available and likely introduce minimal error. This paper illustrates a numerical method for
solving models of this class. It cannot rule out in general that there exists some model for which
this approximation performs poorly, but it at least offers opportunity for researchers to test and
experiment. By suggesting a path forward, these methods could be the next step in empirical
spatial equilibrium models, making dynamics more attainable than is apparent at first glance.
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A Data and Estimation Details
A.1 Housing Stocks and Flows
I use annual county population estimates from the Census, 1980-2011, aggregated to CBSAs to
measure city size and national (urban) population. To measure the housing stock for each metro
area over time, I use single family housing units by county from the decennial Censuses of 1980,
1990, 2000, and 2010, aggregated to the CBSA level. For intercensal years, I allocate the decadal
change in the housing stock by the level of building permit activity in the CBSA, as collected
by the Census and provided by Housing and Urban Development’s State of the Cities Database
(SOCD). As in Glaeser et al. (2014), I use permitting activity as an index because these are a
noisy estimate of actual building activity, and do not necessarily sum to the change in housing
stock. The index allocates permits by their expected arrival to the inventory of housing, which
may vary spatially and temporally, using annual regional summaries of permit-to-completion
rates and times from the Census. The allocated units comprise “construction” by city-year.
To measure input factor intensities, I use detailed data on home size and lot size by location
and vintage year of construction. This information comes from microdata of U.S. county tax
assessor records compiled by real estate data firm Dataquick/Corelogic. The tax assessor files
are a single cross section of urban counties from 2011 to 2012, but the property records contain
year of construction. Thus, I can measure the housing and land intensity per unit by the place
and time of entry into the housing stock. The measure of housing-to-land density is the actual
flooring area ratio (FAR), living area to lot size, for a particular structure. Unfortunately, these
data are not available for multi-unit buildings, so throughout I focus on single family homes.36
Populations are scaled by the fraction of the metro area living in single-family homes taken from
a five percent subsample of the decennial census (Ruggles et al. (2015)).
Then, to get the total stock of living area H and land employed in housing, A, I multiply
the number of units added each city and year by the living area and lot sizes measured from the
tax assessor records for that city and year of construction:
Hjt = (1− δ)Hj,t−1 + unitsj,t · liv areaj,t , Ajt = (1− δ)Aj,t−1 + unitsj,t · lotsizej,t
where j indexes locations and t time. δ is a depreciation rate to be calibrated below. I treat
stock in 1980 as the initial condition because it is the first year of permitting data available in
the SOCD. The estimation will target the policy functions for each location, ijt = Hjt − (1 −
δ)Hj,t−1, ajt = Ajt − (1− δ)Aj,t−1.
The capital component of costs, cc, is obtained using physical construction cost data from
36Construction activity data also tend to be more precise for single family than multifamily, as there is less
measurement error in the counting of units.
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the RS Means Company. The data report material with installation (labor and equipment) cost,
on the basis of square foot of living area, annually by city for 1988-2013. Below I described how
I map these costs to capital costs of the model.
A.2 Calibrations
Some preliminaries are calibrated outside the model. The data come at annual frequency, and
transition processes are set accordingly. The builders’ common discount rate is set to β = 0.95.
Local per capita income is taken from the regional economic accounts data by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. The cities’ annual income processes are found to have unit roots, and I take
the empirical distribution of annual differences to be the shock distribution.
To connect a flow cost of residential housing to sales values available to a builder, I use the
commonly known user cost method (see e.g. Poterba (1992)). I find the implied rental rate,
r = uc · v, where uc is the user cost rate and v is the house value. Poterba (1992) suggests the
user cost formula uc = [(1−κt)(m+κp) +ψ+ νr]− νg, where κt is the income tax rate, m is the
nominal mortgage rate, κp is the property tax rate, ψ is maintenance cost and depreciation, νr
is the risk premium associated with housing, and νg is expected inflation. Calibration of these
follows Poterba (1992), Albouy (2009), and my own estimate of average appreciation by market.
Housing values are set by the sales of newly constructed homes using the Dataquick/Corelogic
microdata on deed transactions. For most counties of the metro areas in the data, transaction
registers from deeds records can be matched to the assessor records using a unique property
identifier. Then, I obtain home values per square foot by averaging transaction prices from 2004
and 2005 sales of newly constructed homes as identified by the year built field. In counties for
which no transactions data were available, I used median value for homes built 2005 or later in
the 2008-2010 American Community Survey (ACS). The values were converted to 2000 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index (less housing) and averaged to the CBSA using housing units by
county as weights. Values over time are pegged to the Federal Housing Finance Administration’s
(FHFA) all-transactions housing price index for the CBSA. Finally, the user cost method is
applied to yield rjt = ucjvjt on a per square foot basis.
The model implies in (7) that housing expenditure constitutes a constant fraction of income,
so that the utility parameter γ can be calibrated from expenditures on housing. Davis and
Ortalo-Magne (2011) have shown using microdata on incomes and rents that average housing
expenditures are remarkably consistent across metro areas, lending direct support for this type of
utility function. However, the utility function has been challenged for its failure to hold across the
income distribution (Black et al. (2014), Broxterman and Yezer (2015)). Considering the current
model focuses on across city differences and uses homogenous agents, the functional specification
seems appropriate for the context. Moreover, the analytical expressions for population and rent
that Cobb-Douglas utility delivers are very convenient, not a trivial consideration for equations
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that might otherwise need to be solved numerically millions of times during estimation. Using
the mean expenditure share of 0.19 (s.d. of 0.03), γ is set to 0.23.
With rents, incomes, population and housing stocks, I turn to the utility conditions of the
model to derive the city-specific amenity value. To recover these, I run the regression
1
γ
ln
yj
yY
+ ln
hj
hN
= D′jµ+ σln
yj
yN
where hN is the national average housing services per person and Dj is a matrix of indicator
variables for each city. The extra parameter σ comes from specifying the amenities in units of
income and relaxes the assumption that population elasticity with respect to income be 1
γ
, which
is empirically far too high.
The depreciation parameter, δ, is calibrated using a regression of the national time series of
housing stock and permits HN,t − in,t−1 = (1 − δ)Hn,t−1; I use the national series (not metros)
because it is longer (1947 using the Statistical Abstract of the United States) and the permits
data are less subject to measurement error. Note that this measures stock depreciation, not
value depreciation. I find 1 − δ = 0.989, indicating that about one percent of the single family
housing stock is destroyed each year.
A.3 Estimation Routine
Having obtained parameters general to all locations and the amenity terms, I turn to estimation
of the cost parameters for the builders in each metro area. While the housing construction data
are detailed, they are actually insufficient to separately identify all the parameters specified in
the general formulation of the model. Estimation will therefore normalize some parameters in
such a way as to maintain the major dimensions of heterogeneity between cities.
First consider the relative factor intensities. Intuitively, these are identified by the building
densities observed in the data. Equation (4) is the model’s density condition. The first challenge
with this condition is that true capital is not actually observed (or easily defined, for that
matter). The RS Means data provide the materials and installation cost for a square unit of
finished housing; this is the bundled k component of i, but not units of k. The observable
density condition is (5), housing services per unit of land. Hence, I set κ = 1 and subtract the
capital cost component from the output price, so that (9) become 1
1−δβ r − cc, where cc is the
construction cost from RS Means.37
37There is significant spatial heterogeneity in the costs, but virtually no evidence that costs fluctuated with the
level of building activity. The finding that construction labor and materials are elastically supplied is common
(see Gyourko and Saiz (2006), Wheaton and Simonton (2007)), but costs vary spatially and temporally with
construction sector wages (the “installation” component). Discussions with data engineers at RS Means indicated
the labor component determines fluctuations. To measure the correlation of construction costs with income, I
run a regression of ccjt on yjt, pooling the data across cities and including city fixed effects: ccjt = cc0,j + ccyyjt,
for which I find ccy = 0.6142 (s.e. 0.0388).
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The second challenge is that the parameters determining density–the TFP φ, the elasticity of
substitution parameter α, and land cost ρ–are in practice difficult to identify.38 The important
feature to maintain is locational heterogeneity in the capital/land ratio, and in the dynamic
model, its evolution with other state variables like output prices and land in use. Thus, I elect
to set ρ = 1, α = 0.5 for all locations, and estimate φ. The restrictive implication of this
assumption is that densities rise faster with VA in ceteris paribus dense places, but this feature
is satisfied in the data.
Next consider the assembly costs. Intuitively, these are identified by level and elasticity
of building activity (conditional on the density and construction material costs). The model’s
condition is (6a). I first need to specify the functional form for c(A), which I set to be 1
1+ν
(c1 +
c2
Ajt
Aˆj
)i1+ν subject to the constraints c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0. This form allows but does not impose that
the assembly costs increase in the amount of land already in use (Aˆj is the average land stock in
the data, a normalization to make the parameters comparable across cities of different physical
size). In practice, it was difficult to separately identify the scale and convexity parameters, so
I set ν = 1 (making costs quadratic), which allows heterogeneity in elasticity to come through
the c1, c2 parameters.
After reducing the estimable parameters, the policy function has become
a =
((R− cc)Φ− 1 + β(VHΦ + VA)
c1 + c2
Ajt
A¯j
Φ2
)
(15a)
i
a
=Φ = φ(1− βVA)0.5 (15b)
These form the joint moment conditions in the estimation of φ, c1, c2 for each city. The
objective function is a vector of squared residuals for each city’s T observations,
M =
T∑
t=1
( (
(ˆijt(c1, c2, φ, υ)− ijt)/ijt
)2(
(
iˆjt(c1,c2,φ,υ)
aˆjt(c1,c2,φ,υ)
− ijt
ajt
)/
ijt
ajt
)2
)
(16)
where the errors are in percentages. The density moments can be noisy in some locations, so
the residuals are weighted by a Gaussian kernel on their distance away from a quadratic trend.
The estimates are then
(
cˆ1, cˆ2, ˆphi
)
= argminM . In practice, I find the parameters by first
conducting a coarse grid search over a wide guess of values, and then a standard simplex-based
minimization routine using the grid search outcome as starting values. This reduces concerns
over finding local minima. Following Wooldridge (2002) on M-estimators, standard errors are
calculated using numerical first and second derivatives to find the score and Hessian matrix for
38The functional form causes the parameters have slightly different implications for density to exploit, but in
city level data, there are simply not enough data points to distinguish these.
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the objective function (16).
B Solution of the Value Function
B.1 Method
Any standard method for solving the agents’ value functions can apply. For this model, I
use projection methods to approximate the the value function in (14). This choice was the
result of two considerations. First, projections tend to be computationally faster since they can
be updated by a simple matrix operation, and there is a preference for speed since the value
functions must be solved many times in estimation. Second, this particular model has closed
form solutions for policy functions if one can evaluate the derivatives of the function functions
(VA, VH in (6a), (6b)). With a linear-in-parameters value function, these are known in closed
form, so the policy step is trivial.
The value function approximation is specified as
V (X) ≈
∑
k
λkFk(x) (17)
where Fk(x) are polynomial functions of the state space and λk are the parameters on these poly-
nomial terms. After much specification testing, I found the polynomial with linear terms, second
order interactions, and the square of the local income state to be a very good approximation.
Adding more terms did not improve the fit of the function.
The projections are evaluated on a randomly drawn sample of state space basis points. For
each location, I use 1000 basis points in total, 500 each from draws of a uniform distribution
with bounds 25 percent outside those of the data, and the empirical distribution of the data.
This evaluates the value function at points outside the areas observed in the data (which may
be relevant for counterfactuals), but makes the basis thick in the neighborhood of the data.
Updating the value function is a computationally inexpensive step of finding
λk = [F (X)− βE(F (X)]−1pi(X) (18)
.
which can be evaluated by a regression. This does however require an evaluation of the ex-
pected polynomial terms, although when using linear-in-parameters projections, these can be
pre-computed.
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The derivative of the value function is readily obtained by
VA ≈
∑
k
λk
∂Fk(x)
∂A
; VH ≈
∑
k
λk
∂Fk(x)
∂H
(19)
B.2 Computation Time
Computational times will of course vary with machines, software, and code structure, but I
report my experience with computation for reference. I used a dual eight core workstation with
8mb of memory per core.
Computer time is not unduly burdensome. Projection methods have the disadvantage of not
guaranteeing convergence–and hence, the researcher might spend time experimenting to find
reasonable functions–but with linearity, they can be very fast. As noted, the value function
evaluation is a simple matrix problem and policy step is a closed form under the approximation.
Conditional on a RER, the individual agent’s problem is effectively a single agent problem.
A single solution of the value function problem took one to two seconds on the 1,000 basis
point state space. Evaluation of the integral over future states, E(F (X)), by Monte Carlo
integration can be somewhat expensive, lasting up to three minutes with 5,000 draws over 50
locations. However, Monte Carlo integration can be easily parallelized, cutting times to about
one minute with pre-packaged Matlab parallelization (over 12 cores). Moreover, the matrix can
be precomputed so it is not embedded in the value function iteration. (It does, however, have
to be reevaluated for each iteration of the RER.)
Nested fixed point estimation of one location takes a few thousand iterations from grid
search to minimization routine. With integration, value function iteration, and evaluation of the
objective function, with steps parallelized when possible, estimation of the 50 locations takes
about three hours. The RER had to be updated about a dozen times, so complete estimation
took about two days run time.
For the counterfactual simulations, the RER has to be updated a from few up to a few dozen
times, depending on how different is the counterfactual from the baseline. The housing tax and
assembly cost simulations take about ten minutes. The coastal amenity simulation takes about
eight minutes. The housing stock destruction simulation takes about four minutes.
C Additional Exhibits
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Table C1: Approximation Error in The Estimated Model: Mean Policy Function Percentage
Differences by Location (10−6)
Perturbation To: Income Housing Stock
City / Perturb. Size: 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.25
New York, NY 0.2251 0.2280 0.2379 0.1184 0.1184 0.1187
Los Angeles, CA 0.0772 0.0781 0.0813 0.0409 0.0409 0.0409
Chicago, IL 0.1293 0.1307 0.1357 0.0684 0.0684 0.0685
Philadelphia, PA 0.1008 0.1018 0.1057 0.0533 0.0532 0.0529
Dallas, TX 0.0478 0.0484 0.0506 0.0253 0.0254 0.0254
Miami, FL 0.0517 0.0524 0.0545 0.0274 0.0274 0.0274
Washington, DC 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
Houston, TX 0.0329 0.0333 0.0349 0.0174 0.0174 0.0174
Detroit, MI 0.1034 0.1047 0.1095 0.0545 0.0546 0.0546
Boston, MA 0.0964 0.0978 0.1023 0.0509 0.0509 0.0510
Atlanta, GA 0.2012 0.2040 0.2133 0.1062 0.1062 0.1064
San Francisco, CA 0.0891 0.0902 0.0940 0.0471 0.0471 0.0471
Riverside, CA 0.0545 0.0552 0.0577 0.0286 0.0286 0.0287
Phoenix, AZ 0.0399 0.0404 0.0423 0.0211 0.0211 0.0211
Seattle, WA 0.0873 0.0885 0.0924 0.0461 0.0462 0.0463
Minneapolis, MN 0.0724 0.0735 0.0771 0.0382 0.0382 0.0383
San Diego, CA 0.0113 0.0115 0.0120 0.0060 0.0060 0.0060
St Louis, MO 0.0929 0.0942 0.0986 0.0490 0.0490 0.0491
Baltimore, MD 0.0365 0.0371 0.0389 0.0193 0.0193 0.0194
Pittsburgh, PA 0.0960 0.0974 0.1019 0.0506 0.0507 0.0507
Tampa, FL 0.0241 0.0244 0.0255 0.0127 0.0128 0.0128
Denver, CO 0.0042 0.0042 0.0044 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022
Cleveland, OH 0.0808 0.0819 0.0858 0.0426 0.0426 0.0426
Cincinnati, OH 0.0220 0.0223 0.0234 0.0117 0.0117 0.0117
Portland, OR 0.0302 0.0306 0.0320 0.0160 0.0160 0.0160
Kansas City, MO 0.0383 0.0388 0.0406 0.0202 0.0203 0.0203
Sacramento, CA 0.0075 0.0076 0.0080 0.0040 0.0040 0.0040
San Jose, CA 0.0472 0.0479 0.0502 0.0249 0.0249 0.0249
San Antonio, TX 0.0271 0.0275 0.0287 0.0142 0.0142 0.0143
Orlando, FL 0.0132 0.0134 0.0140 0.0070 0.0070 0.0070
Columbus, OH 0.0249 0.0252 0.0264 0.0131 0.0132 0.0132
Providence, RI 0.0184 0.0186 0.0195 0.0098 0.0098 0.0098
Norfolk, VA 0.0321 0.0326 0.0341 0.0169 0.0169 0.0170
Indianapolis, IN 0.0502 0.0509 0.0532 0.0265 0.0265 0.0266
Milwaukee, WI 0.0141 0.0143 0.0150 0.0075 0.0075 0.0075
Las Vegas, NV 0.0788 0.0799 0.0836 0.0415 0.0415 0.0416
Charlotte, NC 0.0128 0.0130 0.0136 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068
Nashville, TN 0.1061 0.1075 0.1125 0.0560 0.0560 0.0561
Austin, TX 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Memphis, TN 0.0049 0.0050 0.0052 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
Buffalo, NY 0.0101 0.0102 0.0107 0.0054 0.0054 0.0054
Louisville, KY 0.1165 0.1181 0.1236 0.0614 0.0615 0.0615
Hartford, CT 0.0128 0.0130 0.0136 0.0067 0.0067 0.0067
Jacksonville, FL 0.0205 0.0208 0.0217 0.0108 0.0108 0.0108
Richmond, VA 0.0033 0.0033 0.0035 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
Oklahoma City, OK 0.0129 0.0131 0.0137 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068
Birmingham, AL 0.0993 0.1007 0.1055 0.0524 0.0525 0.0525
Rochester, NY 0.0041 0.0041 0.0043 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021
Salt Lake City, UT 0.0016 0.0017 0.0017 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
NOTES: The table reports the average percent deviation in the policy functions between that using the approximated rational expectations equilibrium
and the perfect foresight outcome. The economy is the 50 location U.S. metro area model deriving from actual data. The experiment holds fixed the
aggregate states and then randomly draws shocks to the distribution of the states across locations. The table reports means over 100 independent
draws for each city. Summaries by city type appear in the main Table 3.
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